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ABSTRACT
Massive amounts of misinformation have been observed to
spread in uncontrolled fashion across social media. Exam-
ples include rumors, hoaxes, fake news, and conspiracy the-
ories. At the same time, several journalistic organizations
devote significant efforts to high-quality fact checking of on-
line claims. The resulting information cascades contain in-
stances of both accurate and inaccurate information, un-
fold over multiple time scales, and often reach audiences of
considerable size. All these factors pose challenges for the
study of the social dynamics of online news sharing. Here
we introduce Hoaxy, a platform for the collection, detection,
and analysis of online misinformation and its related fact-
checking efforts. We discuss the design of the platform and
present a preliminary analysis of a sample of public tweets
containing both fake news and fact checking. We find that,
in the aggregate, the sharing of fact-checking content typi-
cally lags that of misinformation by 10–20 hours. Moreover,
fake news are dominated by very active users, while fact
checking is a more grass-roots activity. With the increas-
ing risks connected to massive online misinformation, social
news observatories have the potential to help researchers,
journalists, and the general public understand the dynamics
of real and fake news sharing.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The recent rise of social media has radically changed the
way people consume and produce information online [21].
Approximately 65% of the US adult population accesses the
news through social media [2, 30], and more than a billion
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people worldwide are active on a daily basis on Facebook
alone [16].
The possibility for normal consumers to produce content
on social media creates new economies of attention [10] and
has changed the way companies relate to their customers [35].
Social media allow users to participate in the propagation
of the news. For example, in Twitter, users can rebroad-
cast, or retweet, any piece of content to their social circles,
creating a competition among posts for our limited atten-
tion [37]. This has the implication that no individual author-
ity can dictate what kind of information is distributed on the
whole network. While such platforms have brought about
a more egalitarian model of information access according to
some [4], the inevitable lack of oversight from expert jour-
nalists makes social media vulnerable to the unintentional
spread of false or inaccurate information, or misinformation.
Large amounts of misinformation have been indeed ob-
served to spread online in viral fashion, oftentimes with wor-
rying consequences in the offline world [8, 22, 29, 23, 27, 7];
examples include rumors [18], false news [8, 23], hoaxes, and
even elaborate conspiracy theories [1, 13, 19].
Due to the magnitude of the phenomenon, media orga-
nizations are devoting increasing efforts to produce accu-
rate verifications in a timely manner. For example, during
Hurricane Sandy, false reports that the New York Stocks
Exchange had been flooded were corrected in less than an
hour [36]. These fact-checking assessments are consumed
and broadcast by social media users like any other type
of news content, leading to a complex interplay between
‘memes’ that vie for the attention of users [37]. Examples
of such organizations include Snopes.com, PolitiFact, and
FactCheck.org.
Structural features of the information exchange networks
underlying social media create peculiar patterns of infor-
mation access. Online social networks are characterized by
homophily [25], polarization [12], algorithmic ranking [3],
and social bubbles [28] — information environments with
low content diversity and strong social reinforcement.
All of these factors, coupled with the fast news life cy-
cle [14, 10], create considerable challenges for the study of
the dynamics of social news sharing. To address some of
these challenges, here we present Hoaxy, an upcoming Web
platform for the tracking of social news sharing. Its goal is
to let researchers, journalists, and the general public moni-
tor the production of online misinformation and its related
fact checking.
As a simple proof of concept for the capabilities of this
kind of systems, here we present the results of a prelimi-
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nary analysis on a dataset of public tweets collected over
the course of several months. We focus on two aspects: the
temporal relation between the spread of misinformation and
fact checking, and the differences in how users share them.
We find that, in absolute terms, misinformation is produced
in much larger quantity than fact-checking content. Fact
checks obviously lag misinformation, and we present evi-
dence that there exists a characteristic lag of approximately
13 hours between the production of misinformation and that
of fact checking. Finally, we show preliminary evidence that
fact-checking information is spread by a broader plurality of
users compared to fake news.
2. RELATEDWORK
Tracking abuse of social media has been a topic of in-
tense research in recent years. Beginning with the detection
of simple instances of political abuse like astroturfing [31],
researchers noted the need for automated tools for monitor-
ing social media streams. Several such systems have been
proposed in recent years, each with a particular focus or a
different approach. The Truthy system [32], which relies on
network analysis techniques, is among the best known of
such platforms. The TweetCred system [9] focuses instead
on content-based features and other kind of metadata, and
distills a measure of overall information credibility.
More recently, specific systems have been proposed to
detect rumors. These include RumorLens [33], Twitter-
Trails [26], and FactWatcher [20]. The fact-checking capa-
bilities of these systems range from completely automatic
(TweetCred), to semi-automatic (TwitterTrails, RumorLens).
In addition, some of them let the user explore the prop-
agation of a rumor with an interactive dashboard (Twit-
terTrails, RumorLens). However, they do not monitor the
social media stream automatically, but require the user to
input a specific rumor to investigate. Compared with these,
the objective of the Hoaxy system is to track both accurate
and inaccurate information in automatic fashion.
Automatic attempts to perform fact checking have been
recently proposed for simple statements [11], and for multi-
media content [6]. At this initial stage, because our focus
is on automatic tracking of news sharing, the Hoaxy system
does not perform any kind of fact checking. Instead, we fo-
cus on tracking news shares from sources whose accuracy has
been determined independently. There have been investiga-
tions on the related problems of finding reliable information
sources [15] and news curators [24].
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Our main objective is to build a uniform and extensible
platform to collect and track misinformation and fact check-
ing. Fig. 1 shows the architecture of our system. Currently
our efforts have been focused on the ‘Monitors’ part of the
system. We have implemented a tracker for the Twitter API,
and a set of crawlers for both fake news and fact checking
websites, as well as a database.
We begin by describing the origin of our data. The sys-
tem collects data from two main sources: news websites and
social media. From the first group we can obtain data about
the origin and evolution of both fake news stories and their
fact checking. From the second group we collect instances of
these news stories (i.e., URLs) that are being shared online.
DATABASE
Store
Monitors
URL Tracker
(stream api)
RSS Parser
Scrapy Spider
Fetch
News SitesSocial Networks
API Crawler
Analysis Dashboard
Figure 1: Architecture of the Hoaxy system.
To collect data from such disparate sources, we make use
of a number of technologies: Web scraping, Web syndica-
tion, and, where available, APIs of social networking plat-
forms. For example, we use the Twitter streaming API to
do real-time tracking of news sharing. Because tweets are
limited to 140 characters, the most common method to share
a news story on Twitter is to include directly a link to its
Web article. This means that we can focus only on tweets
containing links to specific domains (websites), a task that
is performed efficiently by the filter endpoint of the Twitter
streaming API.1
To collect data on news stories we rely on RSS, which al-
lows us to use a unified protocol instead of manually adapt-
ing our scraper to the multitude of Web authoring systems
used on the Web. Moreover, RSS feeds contain information
about updates made to news stories, which let us track the
evolution of news articles. We collect data from news sites
using the following two steps: when a new website is added
to our list of monitored sources, we perform a ‘deep’ crawl
of its link structure using a custom Python spider written
with the Scrapy framework2; at this stage, we also identify
the URL of the RSS feed, if available. Once all existing sto-
ries have been acquired, we perform every two hours a ‘light’
crawl by checking its RSS feed only. To perform the ‘deep’
crawl, we use a depth-first strategy. The ‘light’ crawl is in-
stead performed using a breadth-first approach. We store all
these structured data into a database; this allows convenient
retrieval for future analysis, which we plan to implement as
an interactive Web dashboard. Unfortunately, URLs do not
make for good, unique identifiers, since URLs with different
protocol schema, query parameters, or fragments may all
refers to the same page. We rely on canonical URLs where
possible, and adopt a simple URL canonization technique in
other cases (see below).
1dev.twitter.com/streaming/reference/post/
statuses/filter
2scrapy.org
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Figure 2: Lagged cross correlation (Pearson’s r) be-
tween news sharing activity of misinformation and
fact-checking, with peak value at lag = −13 hours.
Table 1: Summary statistics of tweet data.
source Nsites Ntweets Nusers NURLs
fake news 71 1,287,769 171,035 96,400
fact checking 6 154,526 78,624 11,183
4. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
In this section we report results from a preliminary anal-
ysis performed on a large set of public tweets collected over
the course of several months. Since we are interested in
characterizing the relation between the overall social shar-
ing activity of misinformation and fact checking, we begin
our analysis by focusing on the overall aggregate volume of
tweets, without breaking activity down to the level of an in-
dividual story or set of stories. We take aggregate volume as
a proxy for the overall social sharing activity of news stories.
4.1 Data
We collect tweets containing URLs from two lists of Web
domains: the first, fake news, covers 71 domains and was
taken from a comprehensive resource on online misinforma-
tion.3 We manually removed known satirical sources like
The Onion. The second list is composed of the six most
popular fact-checking websites: Snopes.com, PolitiFact.
com, FactCheck.org, OpenSecrets.org, TruthOrFiction.
com, and HoaxSlayer.com. The keywords we used to collect
all these tweets correspond to the domain names of these
websites.
To convert the URLs to canonical form we perform the
following steps: first, we transform all text into lower case;
then we remove the protocol schema (e.g. ‘http://’); then we
remove, if present, any prefix instance of the strings ‘www.’
or ‘m.’; finally, we remove all URL query parameters.
We collected about 3 months of filtered tweets traffic from
Oct 14, 2015 to Jan 24, 2016. The summary statistics for
the numbers of tweets, unique users, and unique canonical
3fakenewswatch.com
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Figure 3: Daily volume of tweets. The gaps corre-
spond to two windows with missing data when our
collection script crashed.
URLs (Table 1) illustrate the imbalance between the sets of
fake news and fact-checking sites.
4.2 Tweet Volume
Fig. 3 plots the daily volume of tweets. As described be-
fore, we track more fake sites than fact checking ones, so
the volume of fake news tweets is larger than that of fact
checking ones by approximately one order of magnitude.
While both time series display significant fluctuations, the
presence of aligned peaks (Nov 16) and valleys (Nov 2) sug-
gests the presence of cross-correlated activity. To better
understand this, we perform a lagged cross-correlation anal-
ysis, which measures the similarity between two time series
signals as a function of the lag.
Fig. 2 shows the results of the cross correlation analysis,
with lags ranging from −48 hours to +48 hours. A higher
correlation at a negative lag indicates that the sharing of
fake news precedes that of fact checking. To eliminate circa-
dian fluctuations, we use a simple moving average method
with centered window of size equal to 24 hours. The results
suggest that, in the limited number of examples at our dis-
posal, there is a characteristic time lag between fake news
and fact checking of approximately 13 hours. Because the
moving average cleaning could only remove circadian fluc-
tuations, we do not exclude the presence of correlations at
larger lags (e.g., weekly).
While this cross-correlation is suggestive of a temporal
relation between misinformation and fact-checking, it is im-
portant to understand that it is based on aggregate data.
We selected a subset of URLs from both data sets to see if
these correlations also hold at the level of individual events.
We followed two strategies: (1) we selected a single URL
from our pool of fake news stories and a matching URL
from that of fact-checking stories; (2) we considered a small
set of keywords and used them to perform pattern matching
on the lists of URLs.
Table 2 displays the two URLs (A1, A2) used in the first
strategy. The reported story focuses on the current Syr-
ian conflict, and contains several inaccuracies that were de-
bunked in a piece by Snopes.com. For the second strategy,
Table 2: A1: An example of inaccurate news story. A2: Corresponding fact checking page. B1: News articles
reporting inaccurate information about the death of actor Alan Rickman. B2: Corresponding fact-checking
pages.
A1 www.infowars.com/white-house-gave-isis-45-minute-warning-before-bombing-oil-tankers/
A2 www.snopes.com/2015/11/23/obama-dropped-leaflets-warning-isis-airstrikes/
B1
en.mediamass.net/people/alan-rickman/deathhoax.html
www.disclose.tv/forum/david-bowie-alan-rickman-death-hoax-100-staged-t108254.html
worldtruth.tv/david-bowie-and-alan-rickman-death-hoax-100-staged/
beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2016/01/
alan-rickman-the-curse-of-the-69-takes-another-victim-january-man-predicts-his-death-video-3277444.
html
beforeitsnews.com/celebrities/2016/01/
david-bowie-alan-rickman-death-hoax-100-staged-both-69-died-from-cancer-2474208.html
age-69.beforeitsnews.com/alternative/2016/01/
harry-potter-star-alan-rickman-dead-at-age-69-3277454.html
from-cancer.beforeitsnews.com/celebrities/2016/01/
david-bowie-alan-rickman-death-hoax-100-staged-both-69-died-from-cancer-2474208.html
B2 www.snopes.com/2016/01/14/alan-rickman-dies-at-69/
www.snopes.com/alan-rickman-potter-meme/
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Figure 4: Daily volume of tweets for (a) A1 and A2 (cf. Table 2); (b) B1 and B2. Semi-log scale was used
for the plot.
we focused on a recent event: the death of famous actor
Alan Rickman on January 14, 2016. We used the keywords
‘alan’ and ‘rickman’ to match URLs from our database, and
found 15 matches (B1) among fake news sources and two
from fact-checking ones (B2). The fake news, in particu-
lar, were spreading the rumor that the actor had not died.
Fig. 4 plots the volume of tweets containing URLs from both
strategies. Despite low data volumes, the spikes of activity
and the successive decay show fairly strong alignment.
4.3 User Activity and URL Popularity
We measure the activity a of users by counting the num-
ber of tweets they posted, and the popularity of a given
story (either fake news or fact checking) by counting ei-
ther the total number n of times its URL was tweeted, or
the total number p of people who tweeted it. Fig. 5 shows
that these quantities display heavy-tailed, power-law distri-
butions P (x) ∼ x−γ . We estimated the power-law decay
exponents, obtaining the following results: for user activity
γfna = 2.3, γ
fc
a = 2.7; for URL popularity by tweets (tail fit
for n ≥ 200) γfnn = 2.7, γfcn = 2.5; and for URL popularity
by users (tail fit for p ≥ 200) γfnp = 2.9, γfcp = 2.5. These
observations suggest that fake news and fact checking have
similar popularity profiles, with fake news being spread by
accounts that, in some cases, can generate huge numbers of
tweets. While it is expected that active users are responsible
for producing a majority of news shares, the strong differ-
ence between fake news and fact checking deserves further
scrutiny.
In Twitter there are four types of content: original tweets,
retweets, quotes, and replies. In our data, original tweets and
retweets were the most common category (80–90%) while
quotes and replies correspond to only 10–20% of the total,
usually with slightly more replies than quotes. However, we
observe differences between fact checking and misinforma-
tion tweets. The first is that there are more replies and
quotes among fact checking tweets (> 20%) than misinfor-
mation (≈ 10%), suggesting that fact checking is a more
conversational task.
The second difference has to do with how content genera-
tion is shared among the top active users and the remaining
user base. To investigate this difference, we select for both
fake news and fact checking the tweets generated by the top
active users, which we define as the 1% most active user by
number of tweets. In Fig. 6 we plot the ratio ρ between origi-
nal tweets and retweets for all users and top active ones. For
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Figure 5: Complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of (a) user activity a (tweets per user)
(b) URL popularity n (tweets per URL) and (c) URL popularity p (users per URL).
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Figure 6: Ratio of original tweets to retweets for all
vs. top active users.
all users, the ratio is similar; there are more retweets than
original tweets. This is also the case for the top spreaders of
fact checking. However, for top spreaders of fake news, this
ratio is much higher: these users do not retweet as much but
post many original messages promoting the misinformation.
Taken together, these observations strongly suggest that
rumor-mongering is dominated by few very active accounts
that bear the brunt of the promotion and spreading of mis-
information, whereas the propagation of fact checking is a
more distributed, grass-roots activity.
5. CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
Social media provide excellent examples of marketplaces
of attention where different memes vie for the limited time
of users [10]. A scientific understanding of the dynamics of
the Web is increasingly critical [5], and the dynamics of on-
line news consumption exemplify this need, as the risk of
massive uncontrolled misinformation grows. Our upcoming
Hoaxy platform for the automatic tracking of online misin-
formation may provide an important tool for the study of
these phenomena. Our preliminary results suggest an inter-
esting interplay between fake news promoted by few very
active accounts, and grass-roots responses that spread fact
checking information several hours later.
In the future we plan to study the active spreaders of
fake news to see if they are likely social bots [17, 34]. We
will also expand our analysis to a larger set of news stories
and investigate how the lag between misinformation and fact
checks varies for different types of news.
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